

Hearing Transcript

**U.S. House Homeland Security Committee  
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment  
Hearing on Constitutional Rights and Violent Extremism**

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

10:00 am

311 Cannon House Office Building

Witnesses:

**Michael Macleod-Ball**, Acting Director, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),

Washington Legislative Office

**Dr. James Zogby**, President, Arab American Institute

**Dr. Stevan Weine**, Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the International Center of Responses to Catastrophes, University of Illinois at Chicago

**Dr. R. Kim Cragin**, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation

Hearing Transcript:

**HARMAN:**

The subcommittee will come to order.

The subcommittee's meeting today to explore whether there are risk factors or pre-incident indicators of terrorist activity identified by intelligence and law enforcement organizations to enable them in thwarting attacks while preserving -- let me repeat that -- preserving individuals' right to privacy and civil liberties.

Today's hearing is entitled "Violent Extremism: How Are People Moved from Constitutionally Protected Thought to Acts of Terrorism?"

Ahmed Abdullah Minni was a member of the West Potomac High School wrestling team. His coach described him as, quote, "one of the last people," unquote, he would expect to turn to terrorism.

Ramy Zamzam, a 22-year-old Howard University dental student, was, quote, "tolerant and engaging," unquote.

These two young men, along with three workout buddies from the local Gold's Gym in Fairfax County, were recently arrested in Pakistan allegedly attempting to engage in jihad against U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.

Their disappearance didn't raise suspicion until one of the boys' families found a farewell video soon after, and their loved ones frantically contacted the FBI for help in locating them.

And to almost all who knew him, Najibullah Zazi was just a friendly hot dog stand vendor who liked to joke with his customers, not, as it is alleged, an Al Qaida operative plotting an attack on the New York City transit system.

People didn't know what to make of Major Nidal Hasan. But surely no one anticipated that he would carry out the worst domestic terrorist attack since 9/11. In each of these cases, appearances proved far different from reality.

Today, this subcommittee seeks to gain understanding of how people who seem like anyone else -- those who are capable of interacting socially with friends and colleagues and, in many cases, are athletes and scholars -- could be recruited or self-recruited to train to be terrorists.

My eyes were opened four years ago when a terrorist cell in my district -- Torrance, California -- was thwarted by attentive law enforcement.

Excellent police work enabled authorities to connect the dots between a series of gas station robberies and plots to attack local synagogues, recruiting offices and a military base. The folks who were planning to do that are now in jail.

This isn't new subject matter for our subcommittee, either. Since early 2007, we have held a series of careful hearings to understand how someone with radical views, which are protected by our Constitution -- let me say that again: radical views which are protected by our Constitution -- becomes willing to engage in violent behavior and, in some cases, to seek to inflict maximum harm on the maximum number of innocent civilians.

Our earlier efforts have been criticized and, in my view, misunderstood by some civil liberties groups. We drafted a bill creating a commission to examine and report on what causes an individual like Major Hasan to attack. It passed the House by 404-6 in October 2007.

Only then did the ACLU, at witness at today's hearings, which had participated in our meetings, object to it.

And many disagreed that such a commission should examine terrorist recruitment on the Internet. And yet press reports suggest that at least one of the five Alexandria men just arrested in Pakistan posted online comments praising YouTube videos of attacks on a U.S. Army convoy hit by a roadside bomb in Kabul. That is when the alleged recruiter contacted him.

YouTube videos may have inspired them to travel to Pakistan. It also appears, as I said, that the Taliban recruiter used coded messages and Facebook to communicate with them.

In his written statement, Mr. Macleod-Ball of the ACLU, who has been very helpful to this subcommittee, suggests that, quote, "protecting our First Amendment freedoms will both honor our values and keep us safe," unquote.

Of course we must protect these freedoms, but we also must prevent recruiters from cherry-picking kids from our communities and sending them to become jihadists overseas.

I hope our witnesses can help us to separate the intellectual process of committing to a political agenda, protected by the First Amendment, from the operational process of moving from non-violence to violence, which I'm sure everyone on this hearing panel agrees is not protected.

We need to be able to intervene at the right point to stop individuals in our schools, neighborhoods, religious centers and jails who are persuaded by extreme violent messaging, whether through the Internet, friends or mentors, to commit violent acts before it is too late.

So what are the triggers? The number of Americans who are either being recruited or are self-recruiting to carry out terrorist attacks here or abroad is growing. So what are the triggers?

Recently, numbers of young Somali-Americans were recruited in Minneapolis to join the Al-Shabaab terror network in Somalia. Their families were stunned. Two have carried out suicide bombings. So what are the triggers?

And then there's David Headley, the American citizen who has now been indicted for his alleged roles in the Mumbai attacks last year as well as for plotting an attack on a Danish newspaper. This case is doubly important to examine because he was an American recruited to attack abroad. So what are the triggers?

In these cases, terrorist organizations not only successfully recruited Americans but then provided the requisite training to enable those Americans to carry out attacks.

We don't have too many more chances more -- too many more chances to get this right. There is a growing list of people suspected of being recruited and ready to carry to terror attacks in our country and abroad.

If we fail to find the right way to protect both security and liberty, the next attack, I fear, could lead to a shredding of our Constitution, something none of us want.

I want to welcome all the witnesses. In addition to Michael Macleod-Ball, we will hear from Dr. Stevan Weine of the University of Chicago; my friend Jim Zogby of the Arab American Institute; and Kim Cragin of RAND.

All of the members of this subcommittee, who took oaths to protect and defend the Constitution and to provide for the common defense, look forward to your expert analysis and suggestions for tackling this growing threat. Terrorists only have to be right once. We have to try our best to be right 100 percent of the time.

I now yield to the ranking member for an opening statement.

**MCCAUL:**

I thank the Madam Chair and thank you for this very timely and important hearing. And I thank the witnesses for being here today.

Homegrown terrorism is happening right now and right here in the United States. And as we sit here today, someone or some group of people is in the process of being radicalized to extremist ideology.

Most will limit themselves to radical thoughts and speech that are undeniably protected by our Constitution. But there are those who are on the path toward violent acts of terrorism, and their life's work is to try to kill us. Unfortunately, finding and stopping these individuals is like finding a needle in a haystack.

Recent cases highlight the fact that the United States is not immune to homegrown terrorism, and the murders at Fort Hood just north of my district by Nidal Hasan last month remind us not only about domestic radicalization but how vulnerable we really are to an attack.

Thirteen innocent people were brutally murdered and many others injured on November 5th by the hand of a U.S. citizen, a doctor and a member of the United States military. The threat is real, and we are still at risk in this nation. Case after case demonstrates this fact.

Major Nidal Hasan said his allegiance was to the Koran and not to the Constitution, tried to get his bosses to prosecute some of his patients as war criminals, regularly described the war on terrorism as a war against Islam, used a presentation at an environmental health class to argue that Muslims were being targeted by the U.S. antiterror campaign, and was very vocal about the war, very up front about being a Muslim first and an American second.

Daniel Patrick Boyd, a U.S. citizen, and six others were arrested in July, charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. According to the FBI, Boyd trained in terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

And then Mr. Zazi -- probably one of the biggest threats that we've discovered recently in terms of a cell in the United States -- working on behalf of Al Qaida, born in Afghanistan, U.S. legal permanent resident living in Colorado, charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction.

David Headley, a U.S. citizen who attended terrorist training camps in Pakistan, was living in Chicago and planned attacks abroad. We've learned that he was not only planning future attacks but has now been charged with helping to plan the 2008 attacks on Mumbai, India.

And just over the past few days, we're learning about five young men in Virginia, just outside of where we sit here today, who traveled to Pakistan, reportedly to link up with members of Al Qaida. It appears that these young men were radicalized just miles from where we sit here.

And the danger is that we are seeing more and more of these cases, more and more individuals who self-radicalize over the Internet versus being actively recruited by Al Qaida - individuals who are turning radical -- extremist thought -- and then turning to terrorism.

Mr. Smadi, in my home state of Texas, in the United States, was illegally in -- in this country and living in Texas -- was arrested for plotting to blow up a skyscraper in Dallas, Texas.

According to the FBI, Smadi made a decision to act to commit a significant conspicuous act of violence under his banner of self-jihad. Smadi is just one of several recent cases of "lone wolf" plots.

The Patriot Act was designed to give law enforcement and intelligence officials the tools that they need to detect terrorist plots. As provisions in the Patriot Act are set to expire this month, including the "lone wolf" provision, we must not forget that we are still under attack and that the threat is very real.

Waiting until terrorist acts occur and innocent men and women and children are murdered is not an acceptable answer. We must be able to detect and intercept terrorists early.

In doing so, we need to answer some fundamental questions. How can we identify who is on the path to terrorism without infringing on the rights of those exercising their constitutional freedoms?

Are there trends and patterns? Are there risk factors that make an individual more or less susceptible to going down this path? And I look forward to hearing the answers -- answers to some of these questions.

And, Madam Chairman, I hope that this will be just the first in a series of hearings on this topic and that in the future we will be able to hear what the government is doing to help understand and combat the spread of radicalization and terrorist ideology.

There are outreach programs at -- at the NCTC, at DHS and through many of the JTTFs. I would request that in subsequent hearings we hear from those and others about what is being done and what should be done to stop this problem.

And finally, I believe it is important to note that the government alone cannot solve this problem. This not only is a national security problem, it is a community problem. We must work together with government, religious leaders, educators and community groups to reduce this threat.

And I would ask that the witnesses discuss not only what can and cannot be done by the government but what really can be done outside of the government.

And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you. Let me just point out for the ranking member that we have held a series of hearings on this subject, really for the last four years, and made a series of site visits.

The legislation I mentioned was based on a careful series of hearings. We held a hearing a few weeks ago on the threat. I -- I know that you were detained in Texas on -- on official business and not able to attend that. But we will continue to focus on this in the hopes of getting it right.

I now yield five minutes for an opening -- for opening remarks to the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi.

**THOMPSON:**

Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. More than eight years after the 9/11 attacks, it is not particularly surprising that we face the growing, ever-changing threat from violent extremists. The Department of Homeland Security, stood up in the wake of those attacks, has evolved over the course of these past years.

Yet even amidst changes, there are constants. On one hand, we are challenged by the constant and continued threat posed by terrorists, both transnational and domestic.

We are challenged by groups who are able to locate and recruit individuals willing to penetrate (sic) inconceivable acts of violence.

On the other hand, we are supported by the constant efforts of our dedicated law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security professionals who help defend against that threat.

The other constant is that we, too, have a duty. We must remain vigilant. We must be vigilant to ensure that those who bear the brunt of detecting, identifying, disrupting and dismantling efforts by terrorists to strike at us -- our citizens, our homeland and our allies -- have the adequate resources and tools to do so.

We must be vigilant that we do not slip back into a September 10th, 2001 mentality regarding the sharing of information.

No matter how we say it -- knowing what we know, connecting the dots, getting the right information to the right people at the right time -- we're talking about the same thing. An environment in which information is shared is an environment in which better decisions can be made and, ultimately, one in which people are safer.

Finally, we must also be vigilant that we are doing everything we can to break the links between these groups and individuals they are grooming for violence. We, both law enforcement and our communities, must keep a watchful eye open for people like Zazi, Von Brunn, Smadi.

But we must also be vigilant that those efforts, resources and tools are applied consistently, in ways that respect the privacy and civil liberties of American citizens and do not sacrifice our nation's values.

For that reason, I am very glad that we the witnesses here before us this morning. I hope that your insights will help us maintain our both our vigilance and our ideals.

Welcome to you all, and I thank you for being here.

## **HARMAN:**

I thank the chairman for his remarks and would note that other members of the subcommittee are -- are reminded that under committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the record.

I am now -- it is now, really, my -- my privilege to welcome our witnesses this morning. We will start with Dr. Jim Zogby, who is the president and founder of the Arab American Institute and who appears today because I called him and urged him to fit this hearing into his very busy plans for the month.

AAI serves as a political and policy research arm of the Arab American community. Since 1992, Dr. Zogby has written a weekly column called "Washington Watch" on U.S. politics that is currently published in 14 Arab and South Asian countries.

He has authored a number of books, including "What Ethnic Americans Really Think" and "What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs and Concerns." In 2001, Dr. Zogby was appointed to the executive committee of the Democratic National Committee and in 2006 was named co-chair of the DNC's resolutions committee.

He has advised me personally and numbers of us here for years on the Muslim community. And I think it's very important as we review this subject again that we understand the fact that most members of the Muslim community are law-abiding citizens and really want to help us get this right.

Dr. Macleod-Ball is the acting director of the ACLU at the Washington legislative office. This -- his office works with congressional offices on a nonpartisan basis to ensure that American civil liberties are preserved and protected.

Dr. Macleod-Ball has practiced law and held leading roles in the political community, including serving on presidential campaigns. He -- his work as an attorney afforded him the opportunity to argue significant cases on privacy and federal regulatory authority.

And before this hearing, before his testimony here, he wrote the subcommittee a very thoughtful letter which I have re-read in preparation for this hearing on how to understand this problem and hopefully how to get it right. And he has reviewed some draft legislation on recruitment that we are considering.

And I very much appreciate your cooperation with us.

Dr. Weine is a professor of psychiatry and director of the International Center of Responses to Catastrophes at the University of Illinois at Chicago, currently serves as the principal investigator of a National Institute of Mental Health-sponsored study on adolescent refugees from Liberia and Somalia in the United States.

Dr. Weine has authored several articles and books, including "Testimony and Catastrophe: Narrating the Traumas of Political Violence." He was awarded a Career Scientist Award from the NIMH on services-based research with refugee families.

Finally, Dr. Cragin is senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. She is also an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland, where she focuses on terrorism-related issues.

She served three months on General Petraeus' staff in Iraq in 2008, and her RAND publications include "The Terrorist" -- "The Dynamic Terrorist Threat," "Sharing the Dragon's Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies."

Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be inserted in the record, and I would like to start with Dr. Zogby to summarize his statement for five minutes.

Welcome, Dr. Zogby.

**ZOGBY:**

Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of the committee.

The issue before us is, indeed, a critical one. It concerns our national security, to be sure, but it also represents a grave challenge to our national character.

I come at this exploration from several vantage points, some of which you mentioned -- as an Arab American leader for three decades in my community, having worked with Arab Americans and with other Muslim communities as well; as a Ph.D. in Islamic studies also, someone who did post-doctoral work in the impact on religion in societies under stress; as a pollster who, with my brother John Zogby, has intensively polled communities of interest both here in the United States, in Europe and across the Middle East; and as a participant leader in ethnic coalitions in this country that has brought me into close contact with new and not-so-new Americans, watching them move from exile politics into the American mainstream.

Let me begin with a simple observation. Despite real concerns that we all share about recent cases involving the arrests of some young men seeking association with dangerous international terrorist activity, and the arrests of others who appeared to be on the verge of carrying out such activity, we are not Europe.

Our situation here is fundamentally different than that faced by countries on the continent, for several reasons. First and foremost is that America is different in concept and reality.

I've heard and talked to third generation Kurds in Germany, or Algerians in France, or Pakistanis in England who will continue to remain on the margins of their societies. They're Turks. They're Arabs. Or they are Pakis. They do not become British or German or French.

On the other hand, becoming American is a very different process. It's brought countless numbers of immigrant groupings into the mainstream. It is not the possession of a single ethnic community or a single ethnic group -- has the right to define American.

Within generations, diverse communities and religious -- people of different religious backgrounds from every corner of the globe have become Americans. And the important thing is that not only do they become Americans, but America becomes changed as well.

Because of this rich experience, recent immigrants from Arab and Muslim countries come to this country, in effect, with the table set for them. And they find it a -- be a fertile ground for the ever- broadening definition of being American.

Another important difference between our situation and Europe is that people here do not stay on the margins. In fact, because of the extraordinary social and economic mobility available to immigrants, they, in fact, move into enterprise.

The Yemeni community in California, which I first met about 30 years ago, that was picking grapes in the valley are today business owners throughout the country, and their children are in colleges and, in fact, becoming quite successful.

It is true we have a problem. But I think we need to put the problem into context. The arrests of these young men that we have seen is certainly one that we must consider, and we must consider not only the impact on our country but also the impact on the communities affected.

Let me -- let me say the following. We're engaged in a conflict internationally, there's no question about it. And it has repercussions here at home. There are those on both sides of the conflict who have sought to exploit it, who have sought to cast it as an irreversible clash of civilizations.

And just there are some -- as there are some religious and -- and political leaders and media figures in the Muslim world who've sought to paint America with a broad brush of irredeemable evil, there are counterparts here in this country who have tried to do the same with Islam. All of this exacerbates tension and creates problems on all sides.

Despite this, the vast majority of American Muslims and Arab Americans have rejected this fomenting clash. They have worked within the political process available to them. They have fought discrimination. They have combated hate crimes. And they voice their differences in the U.S. as citizens, not as aliens.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that some alienated young men from these communities have become susceptible to antisocial radicalization. This is not new. We've seen it before.

In the past four decades that I've been involved in politics, we've witnessed recruitment into white supremacy and Christian nation and militia organizations -- the Black Panthers, the Jewish Defense League, the IRA, the Tamil Tigers.

The fact is -- is that the allure of certain ideology and romanticized machismo, complete with weapons training and acts of bravado, does provide for some of these young men a dangerous cure to the alienation and feeling of powerlessness that they experience.

We're seeing it again. We're seeing it now with a different group of people. I've reviewed dozens of these cases. I've looked at them up and down. There are multiple differences. And we have to look at the multiple differences and see what they are, because they can't all be painted as one simple phenomenon.

But the pattern of alienation and the -- that leads to violent action as a cure to that alienation seems to run through them all. And this is what we must address.

I believe that we must address it with a scalpel and not with a sledgehammer, because if we, in fact, take a swipe at the whole community, we increase the alienation and we change the character of who we are, making it more difficult for us to deal with the problem.

Let me just come to a close by saying that we have to understand what we're doing right -- not only what is wrong, but what is being done right. Recruitment will remain. We have to find a way to make young men less susceptible to the recruitment.

And I think if we look at what is going on right, we have leading Muslim American organizations actively responding to efforts to deal with the problem.

I can cite the work of the Muslim Public Affairs Committee as an example, reaching out to law enforcement, working with their communities, working in particular with young people to create political alternatives so they can voice their differences with the policies that lead to the aggravation in a way as citizens seeking recourse.

Law enforcement is also working with these communities and doing so quite effectively. And as the situation in Minneapolis or here in northern Virginia shows, the work of the FBI or U.S. attorneys can be productive and helpful in this situation.

And finally, we have a president who is creating a different atmosphere and space for discourse with the Muslim world. This is very important. The answer is not to change who we are or how we react, but to be more of who we are and to continue to do what we do best.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you, Dr. Zogby.

**ZOGBY:**

Thank you.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you. Mr. Macleod-Ball?

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

Good morning. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Sorry, thank you. Good morning, Chairwoman Harman -- thank you very much -- Ranking Member McCaul, full committee Chairman Thompson and other members of the subcommittee.

Thank you for inviting the ACLU to testify about the importance of protecting associational and speech rights while examining violent extremism.

In 1964, Barry Goldwater said that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. Extremism is nothing more than a chosen set of beliefs and, as such, is protected under the First Amendment. An extremist ideology in and of itself must not bring on government censure.

Violent action, however, whether in the name of ideology or otherwise, deserves condemnation.

This hearing is entitled "Violent Extremism." Violence is inherently harmful. Extremism is not. Linking an examination of the two implies that an extremist viewpoint leads to violence and that violence associated with extremism is more worthy of examination than non-ideological violence, even though the latter is more frequent and often causes the same broad and lasting damage.

We will fully support this subcommittee's examination of events that may explain why individuals choose violence as a means to effect political change. We will steadfastly oppose efforts to examine and thus cast official disapproval upon any minority belief system.

In times of national crisis, we have often failed to live up to our democratic ideals. During the Palmer raids, government created 150,000 secret files on those who held radical views or associations or voiced antigovernment policies. Lawyers who complained about this were subject to investigation themselves.

The Lusk Committee and the New York Legislature in the '20s produced a report on revolutionary radicalism which smeared liberals, pacifists and civil libertarians as agents of international communism.

In the early Cold War era, Senator Joseph McCarthy's subcommittee and the House UnAmerican Activities Committee ruined the careers of many loyal Americans based purely on their associations.

In the 1950s and '60s, the FBI ran a domestic counterintelligence program that attempted to suppress political dissent, opening over half a million domestic intelligence files and identifying thousands of individuals to be rounded up in a national emergency.

Instead of focusing on violations of law, these official efforts targeted people based upon their beliefs and associations.

The security threat then was no less real during the first Red Scare and during the Cold War, and yet government abused its power in responding to those threats.

There is some cause for similar concern today. A flawed 2007 New York police report claimed that terrorist acts are linked to the adoption of certain beliefs and that there is a uniform four-step radicalization process from belief to association to terrorism.

But the report was based on just five cases and ignored the fact that millions of people progressed through some or all of these very same steps without ever committing an act of violence.

Ignoring those flaws, the Virginia Fusion Center cited the same report in designating the state's universities as nodes of radicalization requiring law enforcement attention.

A 2008 report by the Senate Homeland Security Committee also restated the same flawed theories in arguing for a national strategy to counter the influence of the ideology.

More recently, however, countervailing studies have begun to appear. A comprehensive United Kingdom analysis concluded that there is no single pathway to extremism. Facing marginalization and racism was identified as a key factor making an individual receptive to extremist ideology.

A 2008 National Counterterrorism Center paper cited America's greater diversity and civil rights protections to explain lower levels of homegrown terrorism here.

In Senate testimony, one terrorism expert blamed moral outrage at abuses of detainees and the perception of a war against Islam as the primary cause of violence, not ideology. He recommended against any measure that would tend to alienate the Muslim community.

And this subcommittee, I would say, is showing admiral sensitivity to the issue just by holding this hearing. We don't question whether this subcommittee should examine violent extremism but, rather, how it should do so.

Singling out for examination violent actions committed by adherents to a particular ideology for scrutiny would predetermine an outcome that would unfairly cast suspicion on all those who share any part of that belief or ideology. It would perpetuate a perception of alienation that helps fuel the violence.

Instead, our best defense lies in a renewed dedication to the protection of associational speech and religious rights. Congress should focus the government's antiterrorism research on actual terrorist acts and those who commit them, rather than on an examination of those who have particular beliefs or who express dissent.

Fear should not drive our government policies. Protecting our First Amendment freedoms will both honor our values and keep us safe.

Thank you for consideration of our views, and I want to pay special thanks to the chairwoman for her constant outreach to our office on these issues.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you very much. We will now hear testimony from Dr. Weine.

**WEINE:**

Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, Chairman Thompson, distinguished subcommittee members, thanks for the opportunity to testify before you today.

I'm a psychiatrist, as you heard, who works collaboratively with refugee and migrant communities to address priority needs in those communities.

Over the past two years, a group of Minnesota Somalis crossed the line to violent radicalization through their involvement with Al- Shabaab. They went to Somalia, they attended training camps and they conducted operations.

The recruits were males between the ages of 17 and 30. They were born in Somalia, raised in refugee camps in Kenya, then came as refugees to the United States when they were children and were raised in an impoverished, divided community. They included high-achieving high school and college students.

In all other ways, the recruits were indistinguishable from the other members of their community. What motivated them? Their movement towards violent radicalization could be explained by multiple push and pull factors.

Most in the Somalia refugee community in Minnesota are subject to push factors that distinguish them from other American Muslims, such as war exposure, forced displacement, living in refugee camps, poverty, ghettoization, secondary migration, inadequate services and family instability.

Pull factors also played a key role -- Internet exposure to violence in Somalia and to extremist political and ideological views, the Somali warrior tradition, the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia.

All these factors were skillfully manipulated by recruiters who were former Al-Shabaab fighters who reached out to potential recruits through social networking technology and face-to-face contacts.

The result was that at least 18 Somalis left home in Minnesota and flew to Somalia without telling their parents. Seven have been killed. Four are in custody. And seven are believed to be in Somalia.

Can violent radicalization occur with more Somali Americans? In my opinion, U.S. Somalis remain highly susceptible to violent radicalization as long as Al-Shabaab is active in Somalia. Recruiters' previous success in convincing the best and brightest young men from that community to go their way shows how susceptible these young Americans are.

Now, the FBI's success in apprehending some recruiters and preventing more from mobilizing is encouraging, but several key concerns remain. Others may have been radicalized and recruited but did not mobilize, and they're still there. Wannabe or "lone wolfs" amongst that community could emerge.

No broader preventive efforts have tried to lessen the susceptibility to recruiters. There is a stark disconnect between counterterrorism and both community policing and service provision in these refugee communities.

Recent events have shown that young men from Muslim refugee and migrant groups from other failed states with violent extremism are also susceptible to violent radicalization.

What steps could help? Now, as a prevention researcher with refugee and migrant communities, I know that prevention, like terrorism itself, is local. Families and communities, local police and services providers -- they all need to be centrally involved. They're in the best positions to identify who is most at risk.

But in order to provide help, they require guidance and support. We should draw upon psycho-social and public health expertise and apply it to preventing homegrown terrorism.

I recommend the following steps. One, conduct research to identify the protective resources in families and communities that mitigate against violent radicalization.

Two, develop and implement parenting education initiatives to protect against radicalization and recruitment.

Three, develop and implement community-level prevention that increases community support for at-risk youth such as mentoring, especially where recruiters are known to be active.

And four, strengthen the collaboration between at-risk communities and local police and service providers.

Now, to take these steps, we need scientifically rigorous, conceptually based investigations of how radicalization and recruitment occur. Journalistic reports are helpful, but they're not enough to develop prevention.

We have started to work with families of recruited Somali youth so we can together develop effective preventive interventions and spread those around.

But of course, the needs for this type of preventive work can be found in several diaspora communities throughout the U.S. The problem is this. Presently, no government entity exists that is committed to sponsoring this research.

We need a multidisciplinary commission or institution that would develop and sponsor investigation into the family and community dimensions of violent radicalization in the U.S. and would work with governmental, non-governmental and community partners.

In conclusion, the recruitment of United States Somalis as well as other recent examples of homegrown terrorism demonstrate that in addition to intelligence-gathering and law enforcement, we need new approaches in counterterrorism for managing those risks, through working with communities and families.

If not, recruiters will continue to know better how to find and help potential recruits than we will. Thank you.

### **HARMAN:**

Thank you, Dr. Weine. I can't help but observe that you described the motivation behind our bill of two years ago, the one that passed the house 404-6.

Dr. Cragin, please summarize your testimony in five minutes.

### **CRAGIN:**

I'd like to thank the chair and ranking member and the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk for inviting me to testify on the subject of terrorist recruitment inside the United States, and -- I just hit the talk button? Yes? And also to take this opportunity to commend the committee for recognizing the importance of this topic.

Over the past 14 years, I've explored what motivates individuals to become terrorists as well as what influences communities to sympathize with terrorist groups. This research can be found in two RAND publications, including "Dissuading Terror" and "Social Science for Counterterrorism." And I'd be happy to speak further about other studies in a classified session.

Unfortunately, recent events have brought this topic to the forefront. As you know, last week, five young American men were arrested in Pakistan, allegedly trying to make their way to training camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Although we have yet to learn fully about the intentions of these five men, they appear to be one of several recent examples of U.S. citizens and residents who have been susceptible to recruitment by Al Qaida and associated movements.

Indeed, examples exist of Americans traveling abroad to fight as well as participating in training camps abroad in anticipation of conducting attacks here at home.

What happens in these training camps? Bryant Neal Vinas, another individual arrested on terrorism charges, has described activities in a Peshawar camp as follows: an introduction to the AK-47 and other guns, followed by a 15-day course in how to make suicide belts and rocketed-propelled grenades, and then graduation.

So how do individuals end up in these training camps? Research conducted at RAND and elsewhere suggests that no single pathway towards terrorism exists, making it difficult to determine precisely how and why individuals are susceptible to recruitment.

Having said that, for the remainder of my testimony I will address two questions -- first, how do individuals generally progress from articulating sympathy to actively participating in terrorism, and second, what can we do about it.

To answer the first question, it's useful to explore the radicalization processes that individuals and clusters of individuals have gone through, which can be understood as having three phases.

In the first phase, termed availability, environmental factors make individuals susceptible to messages and appeals from terrorist groups. Of course, these factors vary according to individual, but they might include peer group influences or frustration with foreign policy.

While the first phase can occur on the Internet, the second phase, termed recruitment, usually occurs after contact between individuals and the clandestine groups.

That is, our research, as well as others', suggests that recruitment works best when virtual contact has been strengthened through social linkages. Some potential recruitment nodes include prayer groups, social clubs or even criminal gangs in prisons.

The third phase of the radicalization process yields a commitment to action on the part of certain individuals. This final step has been the most difficult to isolate in research.

In some instances, a specific grievance appears to have acted as a final trigger. Another common factor, at least for diaspora communities, appears to be participation in a training camp abroad.

I am often asked what motivates terrorism. Is it ideology, politics or poverty? And my answer is yes, all three, to varying degrees.

So how can we best intervene in this process? If determining how individuals become terrorists is difficult, then deriving intervention strategies is even more problematic.

Our research suggests that we best intervene before individuals depart for training camps, because these experiences tend to harden their commitment towards violence. Yet in many instances, individuals have not engaged in illegal activities prior to their departure.

These circumstances have proven to be the most difficult, and so I would like to focus on them for the rest of my testimony.

First, beyond U.S. borders, the U.S. government could work with partner nations to pressure those recruiters who have shown success at reaching Americans. It is well known that Al Qaida is interested in recruiting new fighters from the United States. This is not a new phenomenon.

So as partner nations work towards muting the voices of recruiters who have reached susceptible individuals within their own countries, the U.S. could encourage them to extend these programs to focus on western recruits.

Second, within the United States. The U.S. government could work with local community leaders to develop programs that reduce -- reduce susceptibility to messages articulated by Al Qaida and associated movements.

The case of the five youths arrested in Pakistan last week reportedly was brought to the attention of U.S. authorities through Muslim community leaders. And I cannot imagine how difficult it was for these community leaders to call U.S. authorities. And regardless of the outcome, we owe them a great deal of respect and gratitude.

Nonetheless, more could be done. In Singapore, for example, a group of Muslim scholars have worked with individuals arrested on terrorism charges and their families to help reintegrate these individuals back into the community.

A similar model could be used for U.S. citizens and residents who are accused of participating in training camps abroad, which brings me back to the original question of how and why do individuals become terrorists.

Clearly, more needs to be done to get a better understanding of this phenomenon, yet I would urge you not to leave it at that.

As we move forward, we also need a better understanding of how Al Qaida and associated movements retain the loyalty of their recruits and, perhaps more importantly, why individuals choose not to become terrorists, for if we are truly going to develop barriers to Al Qaida recruitment in the United States, then it is equally important that we understand the motives of those who reject Al Qaida's overtures. Thank you.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you very much, Dr. Cragin. And thank you to all the witnesses. I think this testimony is extremely helpful. We will now proceed to questions, and I yield myself five minutes.

To all the -- the witnesses, let me just read a list here. John Walker Lindh. Lackawanna Six. Brooklyn Bridge plot. Columbia shopping mall bomb plot. Lodi, California sleeper cell. Sears Tower- Miami-FBI bomb plot. Adam Gadahn. Torrance terror cell, which I mentioned earlier. Fort Dix six. Somali Americans disappear from Minneapolis -- we've just heard about that. Bronx terror plot. Shooting at the Arkansas military recruiting station. Najibulla Zazi. David Headley. Tarek Mehanna. Nidal Hasan. And most recently the five in Alexandria, Virginia.

This is a long list. I don't want just to list Arab Americans or Muslim Americans. But this is a long list of U.S. residents or U.S. citizens, in most cases, who are somehow experimenting with terror.

And while I agree with you, Mr. Zogby, that we need a scalpel and not a sledgehammer, and while I agree with you, Mr. Macleod-Ball, that we should focus on actual terrorist acts and not someone's belief system -- I truly agree with that -- we need to do something here.

We need to intervene. Hopefully we will not intervene after the fact, but we will find exactly the right place to intervene to prevent these terror actions. So our second two witnesses, Dr. Weine and Dr. Cragin, have -- have suggested ways to learn more.

I'd like to ask our first two witnesses what strategies do you think we, the United States government, this subcommittee, should undertake to intervene at the right moment to prevent acts of terror by people like the list I just read against the United States?

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

Thank you, Chairwoman Harman. I think there were a lot of good ideas expressed by -- by all of the witnesses here today. I would reiterate our point that you start with the violence. You don't start with the ideology. The -- adding to the list, we could also add any number of Ku Klux Klan...

**HARMAN:**

I agree with you.

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

... Weather Underground or...

**HARMAN:**

Right.

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

... Symbionese Liberation Army. There are any number of examples of -- of terrorist action within our country.

And by starting with the ideology and saying that you're going to define those -- you're going to examine those acts, you're predetermining the outcome in a way that your conclusions will be -- will tend to cast aspersions on the entire Muslim community.

**HARMAN:**

I agree with your definition of the problem. What's the solution?

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

The solution is to start with -- with a different universe of actions. As you're examining historical events -- actions -- you look at what moves different people in different contexts from a nonviolent to a violent situation.

I think that is the best way -- first of all, you're looking at actual historical events and not making assumptions about the future, but you're also -- by definition, if you're starting with a different universe of people, you are not -- you are not predetermining a focus on -- on the Muslim community.

**HARMAN:**

Dr. Zogby?

**ZOGBY:**

I -- the -- you asked the question of the hour, and it is the critical one. Let me just make a couple observations about the list you read. They are -- in many ways, they can be broken up into different groups. But with the exception of two, they were all stopped. They were stopped because we were doing things right.

And the cooperation with the Muslim community, the outreach to the Muslim community, the significant work of law enforcement using the tools that are available to them and working with the communities, has been effective in -- in every one of these instances in stopping.

In the case of Nidal Hasan, which is, of course, a horrific act of terror and of -- and an awful incident, law enforcement failed. And -- and I think we have to say that.

I mean, there was a failure here -- failure to collect the -- to connect the dots, and because the -- the -- our hands were tied because of -- of restrictive ways we approach guns, gun laws and gun information, the fact that he went and bought a weapon that is not to be used for hunting or for -- for sharp shooting but -- but had -- we have records of this man in contact with someone that we have on a terrorist watch list.

We have all of the -- the information that you gave us of -- of his very questionable -- I'm sorry, Congressman McCaul -- of his questionable activities while in the military, and yet the dots were never connected. And -- and the different agencies weren't talking to each other about what was going on there.

And that is a problem that we, I think, will have to -- have to look more closely at. But what to do about it? I think we're doing things -- we're doing things right. We're stopping these people. We're invigorating cooperation between law enforcement and the communities.

And we're changing the tone of the debate in our country that I think is bringing more people forward ready to cooperate, which is why people have turned in people and are working with law enforcement to stop this problem.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you very much. My time has expired. I just want to observe that Dr. Cragin said we -- we ought to say thank you to the law-abiding members of these communities who do turn in family members or point law enforcement toward problem with family members, and so I -- I think that's a very good suggestion, and I would like to say thank you to those community members.

We have a full group of members. That's because this hearing is so interesting. And I would like to ask unanimous consent that Ms. Jackson Lee, who is not a member of the subcommittee, can sit with us and ask questions after other members. Any objection? So ordered. Now I yield five minutes to the ranking member, Mr. McCaul.

**MCCAUL:**

Thank you, Madam Chair, again. Behind me is an illustration of homegrown terrorism arrests since November 2008, and I think that this picture really says it all and -- and why this hearing is so important.

And -- and again, Madam Chair, thank you for holding this. This is a threat. And you know, I was a federal prosecutor and -- and a -- a thought itself is not a violation of the law.

So, Mr. Macleod-Ball, I agree with you that -- that a belief or an ideology is not a prosecutable offense. Always a conspiracy requires an overt act. An overt act is -- is the first step towards completing a conspiracy which does make it a violation of the law.

However, it always starts with -- with an ideology. It always begins with -- with a radical idea or a belief that eventually does come to fruition -- not in every case, thank God, but in the cases that we've seen. We've been able to stop a lot of these cases, fortunately, but some have not.

I think the Hasan case, Dr. Zogby, is a very good illustration of a case that failed, was a whole failure of -- of law enforcement, as you said. I think that was absolutely correct.

When we had a major in the Army, United States Army, at the largest military installation in the United States just north of my district having communications with one of the top Al Qaida recruiters in Yemen, having communications with Pakistan -- this information apparently was in -- in the hands of the Joint Terrorism Task Force in Washington, one of the members from the Department of Defense, and yet that information was not shared with the -- with the very base where the major resided.

And don't you think General Cone, who I talked to at the memorial service -- we buried 13 soldiers there, and I talked to the wounded, who said, "Yes, he screamed Allah Akbar as he shot us." Don't you think that General Cone may have liked to have had that information

that he had a major at his base that -- that was communicating with a top Al Qaida recruiter in Yemen?

And yet that didn't happen. That information was not shared with the military, with Fort Hood. I know that may be a little bit -- I think it is on point, because this man radicalized, and what we don't know is whether he radicalized all on his own or whether he had a little bit of help from the outside.

What can we do -- and I have so many questions I could bring up today, but that case is a classic case of failure. What can we do better to ensure that there -- there are no more Hasans out there? As General Cone told me, how many more are out there?

They're a threat to our United States military because we know Al Qaida targets the United States military. It's out of their play book. They targeted Fort Dix. They -- they bring back their play book time and time again, like they did with the World Trade Center, and like they'll probably try to do with the capital.

How can we stop another Hasan case from happening again? And I'll direct that to any -- anybody on the -- Dr. Cragin, I don't know if -- you seem to -- anybody who'd like to tackle that.

**CRAGIN:**

Sure. I mean, I can -- I can start, and then please feel free. I would say, first of all, I'd like to get away from the term "self-radicalization." There are some -- some examples of that, but overwhelmingly there is normally a mentor -- I think the term was used -- involved in the radicalization process.

And so like I said during my testimony, I mean, one thing is to actually start focusing some attention on -- on these mentors. That attention doesn't necessarily have to be law enforcement attention, but I think that is -- is one way to do it.

But I also think, unfortunately -- you know, Timothy McVeigh -- I'm from Oklahoma, so Timothy McVeigh also got through, right? So I think that we're not going to be able to stop all of the lone wolves, and that -- that's sort of an unfortunate reality that we're facing today.

**MCCAUL:**

Anybody else on the panel?

**WEINE:**

Yes, I think that prevention is the right word, and the question is how you think about prevention.

And I think it's important to think about prevention not strictly from a law enforcement point of view but, say, from a community policing point of view and from a public health point of view, where we try to establish relationships, change people's thinking and change people's behavior in such a way to catch them upstream before they go too far down the line.

I believe we're not doing that right now. I think counterterrorism as I see it in the microcosm of, say, the Somali community in Minneapolis is limited to FBI criminal investigation. And with all due respect to those people who do that important work, I think that there are still shortcomings in the area of community policing and -- and preventive approach.

There are good people in those communities, parents and community leaders, who want to support these efforts, but they're not involved and engaged. And that's what prevention means. That's what I think we have to be doing more of.

**MCCAUL:**

Dr. Weine, I -- let me just say, I -- I completely agree with you. I worked as a federal prosecutor, worked with Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

I think one thing that we need to do a better job -- is reaching out to the Muslim community and -- and getting involved in the community, where we can identify the 1 percent or less than 1 percent of potential threats.

**HARMAN:**

Mr. McCaul, let Dr. Zogby respond to your question briefly.

But to all members, let's try to stick strictly to the five minutes to be fair to everybody.

**ZOGBY:**

It does not begin with ideology. Ideology is the paint on the surface that is already there. And I think -- and he said "Allahu Akbar." He did not mean "Allahu Akbar." What he meant was, "I'm going to kill you, I hate you, I am angry, really angry."

It's sort of like -- you know, when I used to teach religion, I used to say, "Meaning of -- the meaning of a word is how it's used." If -- if somebody says, "Oh, Jesus Christ," that doesn't mean that they're a devout believer. It usually means they're angry. Or, "Oh, Jesus Christ," I'm excited. We cannot allow the abuse of language to mask purpose, to take our attention off what is going on.

And that is why I agree with Mr. Macleod-Ball. You judge the actions, not the language. In another era, as Peter Bergen said on CNN the other night, Major Hasan may have turned to Maoism or may have turned to some other ideology.

The language of the moment to describe anger, to describe the conflict we're having and the deep alienation that I'm feeling, is this language of religion. Do not let them confuse us with what the real is -- with what's really going on here, because that's when we start using the sledgehammer.

And as I'm watching the media, CNN covering this problem of what happened in Pakistan, showing Muslims on the Mall on Service Day, when they were committing themselves to service to our country, praying, that was the backdrop.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you.

**ZOGBY:**

The message this sends to Muslims is very dangerous, and we have to be careful. Judge the action. The susceptibility will be there. We have to deal with the susceptibility, not with the language they use.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you, Dr. Zogby. I now yield five minutes to the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Thompson.

**THOMPSON:**

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Excellent panel. Thank all of you for your -- for your testimony.

One of the things I want to do is try to broaden the discussion. We just saw a broad panel of where arrests have taken place, but it only focused on a very narrow, tight arrest for certain kinds of things.

One of the things I want us to do as a -- a committee is look at acts of violence, extremism, in its totality, not in a very narrow focus, so that we can understand that the -- the debate here is important, but is a part of a broader debate that we need to take as a -- as a committee.

Specifically, for each witness, can you identify for the committee the broader violent extremist potential that exists here, and what groups may be part of it here in this country, so we can see the -- the bigger picture of -- of the discussion?

And I'll take Dr. Zogby, and we'll go down.

**ZOGBY:**

I can just tell you that not being someone in law enforcement himself but in constant contact with law enforcement because that's what we do in our work, they are deeply concerned since -- and I -- it's -- it's no secret -- since the election of our president with white supremacist movements that are a -- a lot of chatter and a lot of danger and a lot of concern.

And I think that that is an area that is -- is -- is something we have to look at, because the susceptibility, especially in an economic downturn, and especially in time of war, and especially now with this sense of -- of -- of revenge about government is a problem. I think we have to take a very close look at that and continue to look at it. It's the other language that is used today.

**THOMPSON:**

Thank you.

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

I want to say this in the right way. I don't want to name groups and cast aspersion on them simply by naming them in -- in this context.

But historically, there are many groups in our country, some of which I referenced in -- in my testimony and in my previous answer, and -- and there are either remnants of those groups left today or there are people who believe the same things and act to further those beliefs.

**THOMPSON:**

Yeah. Well, and I -- and I guess -- and I accept that, but if -- if you can talk about the ideology rather than the name of the group, if that would give you a little...

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

Well, let -- let me just -- let me go about it this way. Does -- does Timothy McVeigh have more in common with an Islamic terrorist or with any Christian believer?

I think most people would say with any Islamic terrorist. It -- it's not the belief that -- that is the defining moment. And it's as Dr. Zogby said, that's the paint that -- that may be present. It may be present in any situation.

But you start with the -- the -- with the propensity for violence, however that may be caused, and then you add -- you add the -- the -- the background material that gives the person the basis for -- for going forward after he or she already has the propensity to violence.

And so I'm very reluctant to -- to -- to talk about it in that way, because I think it starts with the factors that create the propensity to violence, which some of the other witnesses mentioned in their testimony.

### **WEINE:**

Thank you. I'm concerned about the -- the place where three broad processes interact, so one is failed states, people -- people who come from failed states, where the -- two is where there are violent extremist movements and organizations. And three is that they now exist in refugee or migrant communities in this country that face many challenges of daily life.

So the Somalis certainly fit that, but so -- so do several other communities that we have to be concerned about. I think this is very challenging.

The other broad thing that -- that concerns me is the issue of movement, migration, secondary migration within the United States.

So I'd like to share this -- this fact with you, that there are presently, say, about 84 Somali - - 84,000 Somalis in -- in Minnesota. Probably only about 20,000 of them were resettled there. That means that about 60 more thousand of them came from another state in the United States where they were primarily resettled.

This represents a shortcoming, systematic shortcoming, in the U.S. refugee resettlement system, because when they move to another state, they don't come with services attached. So this is a setup for underserved refugee community.

We might think about what other populations in the U.S. are -- also fit that pattern. Thank you.

### **CRAGIN:**

Just to answer -- just to answer your question quickly, in my written testimony, I talk about the model of the radicalization process. We actually stole it from -- stole it -- we borrowed -- we derived it from Phil Zimbardo's work on cults.

So if you were to broaden the community with that radicalization process, it would include both criminal gangs and cults, and that's one way of broadening it without looking at ideology or naming specific groups.

**THOMPSON:**

Thank you very much.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dent for five minutes?

**DENT:**

Thank you, Madam Chair. I'll start with Dr. Zogby. My regards to your cousin Charles. First, you know, we're often told that the United States is less susceptible to homegrown terrorism than European nations, and I think you sort of alluded to that earlier in your remarks.

Do you believe that is still the case? And is -- you know, if the United States is less susceptible, could you go into why?

**ZOGBY:**

The -- the important thing to understand here is that having dealt with and -- and gone and talked to some of these groupings in -- in Europe -- actually, it was something the State Department and another program I did with BBC was -- was interested in kind of seeing the differences between what is going on here and going on there.

The degree of alienation is fundamentally different there than here. Here, the problem exists on the margins. There, it is much more widespread.

The -- the Somali kids didn't tell their parents. The Pakistani kids here in -- the kids here in northern Virginia didn't tell their parents. That tells you something right away.

The community base of support in Europe for this problem of radicalization is very different than here, where the problem, as I said, exists on the margins and the parents actually turn them in, or their peers will turn them in.

And -- and so I say that becoming American -- the process of becoming American is determinative in this instance. It is the more compelling force that is the antidote to this radicalization and this sense of alienation.

And I think we have to -- and that's why I say at the end of the day what we have to do is more of what we do, and do it better, instead of less of that.

**DENT:**

Well, the reason I asked the question -- because you just saw the map that was held up a moment ago. When you saw all these recent incidents around the country, it has caused me to think -- I've always -- was under the impression, too, that Europe was more susceptible to this type of radicalization than the United States.

But given what's happened in recent weeks and months, I've started to question that in my own mind.

**ZOGBY:**

And that's why I suggest, sir, if you look at each one -- take them apart, see where the patterns are and where the patterns aren't. The Fort Hood one is fundamentally different than Minneapolis.

And -- and you know, I would just say to -- to Dr. Weine that one of the things from Somali experts I understand -- and people in that community in Minneapolis -- is that since the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the lure of Shabaab has gone down.

And -- and -- and the important thing again in Minneapolis is that the parents turned them in...

**DENT:**

Yeah.

**ZOGBY:**

... and the U.S. attorney had the full cooperation of the parents, and the parents looked upon this arrest as a relief, because the people who were preying on their kids were gone.

And I think that, you know, we -- we -- we're doing it well. It is not the mainstream. It's the margins. And we have to continue to ensure that it stays on the margins.

**DENT:**

Thank you. And, Dr. Cragin, you know, we have received a variety of opinions, mixed opinions, on how government should engage religious leaders to address the issue of radicalization.

As you know, some say there should be increased cooperation between law enforcement and Muslim clergy and religious leaders, since they're certainly in a position to deter Muslim teenagers from going down the path of violent radicalization.

Others suggest that government involvement would likely backfire, causing moderate voices we hope to encourage to be discredited as -- as government propaganda.

Do you believe that the government and law enforcement officials should more actively engage with Muslim religious and clergy leaders? And how can this be done without discrediting these leaders?

**CRAGIN:**

Sure, absolutely. Let me start by saying one thing -- and to agree with Dr. Zogby on the fact that I don't think that we see the susceptibility level here as we do in Europe.

But one thing that you do see that's common between the two of them is a separation of these cells or these bunch of guys from their own Muslim community, which makes law enforcement and relying on Muslim communities to interact with law enforcement even more problematic.

That is, they're not separation -- separating from American society themselves, but they're even separating from their own Muslim community a little bit. And so this makes this engagement even more problematic.

But I do tend to think that engaging, like the way our law enforcement are, with local Muslim community leaders is the way to go, and that there -- if you do not -- if you're wanting to protect civil liberties and you're not wanting really intrusive law enforcement tactics, then the way to go is to continue to engage the Muslim community leaders, and -- I agree with Dr. Zogby -- like we have done successfully.

I think these are really -- we have some really great examples of how this has worked in this country.

**DENT:**

Well, thank you. And for Mr. Macleod-Ball, do you believe that domestic radicalization is a very real threat in the United States?

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

There are many threats in the United States, and that is one among them. I think perhaps we're talking about some semantic issues when we talk about the objections that we've voiced in the past to some of the subcommittee's ideas.

In my written testimony -- we had 1.3 million violent crimes in -- in the United States reported in 2008. Is that a threat? Certainly it's a threat. And part of that threat is -- is what you mentioned.

There are some people that are motivated through ideology, certainly. There's many people who are motivated through something other than ideology. So the ideologically based threats -- sure, they exist, and we ought to be investigating those along with -- along with the various other threats at the committee's discretion.

**DENT:**

Yield back.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you very much. Mr. Carney, five minutes.

**CARNEY:**

Thank you, Madam Chair. You've stimulated so many questions, and we don't -- this will be a long series of -- of hearings, I hope, at some point.

Dr. Zogby, I -- I appreciated your making the distinction, forcing us to make the distinction. I -- I would like your opinion, though. Do you think the -- the case of -- of Somalia, as we've spent a lot of time talking about today, is somehow fundamentally different than those who are recruited to expand some sort of international caliphate?

**ZOGBY:**

It -- it may very well be. It -- that does not mean that we should not have taken measures to protect these kids...

**CARNEY:**

Of course.

**ZOGBY:**

... from recruitment and engagement in activities that are antithetical to -- to who we are and what we want.

But there is a fundamental problem here, and if I can just take a moment to look at it, it's the problem of exile politics. And I think, you know, ultimately, we're going to have to make a decision as a country what route we go on this one.

I remember growing up in a situation where there was no such thing as dual citizenship. And now you can have dual citizenship with many countries all over the world. And now you can vote in elections in countries all over the world while you're in this country as an American citizen.

And now you can be a Bush administration official in the Department of AID and you can go and run for office in Lebanon for parliament and then decide whether or not you want to come back to the United States or not.

The issue here -- you know, and I spoke with the JDL before, and these guys floating back and forth and doing whatever they do -- I think we have some issues here we have to look at as a country.

I grew up in a situation where when I saw the pictures of George Washington crossing the Delaware, I was on the boat with him. And -- and when I saw Lewis and Clark on the frontier, I was with them. I mean, it was my story.

And we are inhibiting that story from becoming the dominant American narrative when we are in a situation today where we encourage dual citizenship, people voting in other elections, and the next step is, "Oh, my God, Ethiopia invaded my country. I'm going to go and defend my country."

We have to ask questions. When our Department of State funded the elections in Iraq in this country and the co-chair of the Republican Party of San Diego is quoted in the L.A. Times saying, "At last, for the first time in my life, I will get to vote," and I said, "What the heck is going on here? You just voted in the presidential election in this country. That's your country here. Make a choice, man." I think we have to look at that.

That's not going to make -- I'm not going to be popular with both parties, and even with people in my own community, but I do think that if we do not take the issue of becoming American -- take it seriously, make it work, all that it means, I think we're running down a road here that is going to ultimately get us in trouble everywhere.

Not just in the Middle East but as conflicts emerge everywhere around the world, we're going to have people saying, "That's my fight. That's my fight. IRA, that's my fight. Israel, that's my fight. Arabs, that's my fight. Pakistan, that's my fight." That's not a good situation for us to be in as a nation.

## **CARNEY:**

What do you suggest in terms of public diplomacy?

**ZOGBY:**

Public diplomacy -- I think that we have to tell the American story. We have to tell it there. We have to tell it here. We have to encourage people becoming American here.

And we have to work with the full gamut of -- of institutions and the processes that have worked for us in the past to make these kids feel that there is an opportunity for them to fully participate.

The fact is if -- if we hire more Arab Americans and Muslims in -- in -- in government, if we open law enforcement to their -- their ranks, if we do more of what we do well, the lure of overseas will -- will pass by them completely.

They came here or their parents came here to be part of this. We have to make sure that they are a part of it and identify with it fully.

**CARNEY:**

Thank you. Dr. Weine, I want to switch gears a little bit, and since you're from Illinois I have a question concerning the potential movement of hundreds of Gitmo detainees to -- to Illinois.

And this is for all of you, actually. Is that going to have some kind of impact on recruitment, do you think? Is it going to be a damper to recruitment? What's your opinion on -- on the -- the transfer of the -- the detainees?

**WEINE:**

I know that there's -- there's a vigorous political dialogue taking place in Illinois about -- about that, and -- and I'm really not in a position to -- to comment on that. I think that in terms...

**CARNEY:**

No, no, I'm not asking about the political dialogue. I'm asking from your professional opinion, is this going to have some kind of impact on recruitment?

**WEINE:**

Well, I think that recruiters are very clever, and recruiters are always looking for a way to manipulate events to their advantage. And I'm sure that recruiters will find a way to manipulate that to their advantage. That doesn't mean that -- that that shouldn't be done -- moving Gitmo detainees into Illinois -- or not. I think that should be evaluated on a different level.

But I think that the -- the point in terms of prevention is we need to find ways to stay one step ahead of where recruiters are.

**CARNEY:**

Mr. Macleod-Ball?

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

Although I'm not a psychiatrist, I would like to add that unless the -- unless the -- the movement of the detainees also includes a commitment to due process and to actually provide rights to all of the detainees to determine definitively what their status is, then I think that would serve as the basis for -- for recruiters seeking to point to the United States treating folks with something other than justice.

**CARNEY:**

Dr. Cragin?

**CRAGIN:**

I've -- I've always been in favor of shutting down Guantanamo Bay because it has been used as big rhetorical device in the -- in the Al Qaida media.

But I would agree that wherever you decide to move it you'd want to give the detainees due process in order to tamp down as much of that rhetoric in the future, yeah.

**CARNEY:**

Thank you.

**HARMAN:**

The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Broun of Georgia is recognized for five minutes.

**BROUN:**

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Dr. Zogby, your last testimony was extremely refreshing to me, and I have long been a believer that the hyphenization of America is one of the biggest problems we have with radicalization and all these other things.

I think it's true in Europe because if you look there, you see the radicals coming out of a community that is not allegiant to their own country or not even allegiant to the -- to the European Union but is allegiant to that radical element within their community.

And I think a common language -- English as the official language of America -- is absolutely critical for us to help further exactly what you're saying. I think stopping the dual citizenship is absolutely critical, and all those things.

I appreciate your testimony in that regard, because I could not agree with you any -- any further.

Yes, sir.

**ZOGBY:**

I did not mean some of that, and let me just explain what I do mean. What I -- what I do mean -- I do oppose the dual citizenship, and I do think we have to move people from exile into the mainstream.

But it is wonderful that I'm an Arab American. I'm a -- American is the noun. Arab is the adjective. I have a heritage that I'm proud of. It gives me no end of joy...

**BROUN:**

Well, I apologize for interrupting you, but just for the sake of time—we all come from different backgrounds. We have different beliefs. We have different heritages. But being an American is the most important thing, in my opinion, for all of us.

**ZOGBY:**

And the meaning of that being American is that we eat spaghetti, and we eat tabouli, and we eat latkes, and -- and we are, in fact, this diverse culture of people that all has become America, and America's become changed, too.

**BROUN:**

I agree with you, and we ought to focus on being Americans.

**ZOGBY:**

... focus on that and the American story. I agree with you on that part.

**BROUN:**

Well, I -- I was glad to hear your earlier testimony. But nowhere is the threat more real than in the alarming manifestation of homegrown terrorism and the mutating nature of the terrorist threat.

Fort Hood was a horrible example of radicalization turning from -- from ideology -- an ideological expression to terrorism and an act.

Dr. Cragin, it appears that political correctness is a tremendous roadblock to addressing radicalization and homegrown terrorism, and I'd very much like to hear your thoughts on how we can address that issue.

**CRAGIN:**

I've actually had people say this to me before, that political correctness is a roadblock to addressing the issue of radicalization. I would say in my experience that that's not necessarily the case.

There is some discomfort in dealing with the term of ideology. But in this sense, to me, ideology is -- I think as this panel has suggested, is sort of a broad brush or is a rhetorical device that tends to be used.

But when it comes down to individual motivations, ideology doesn't end up being -- research would demonstrate the ideology doesn't end up being one of the primary motivating factors in most cases.

And so to me, political correctness, you know, if there's a bit of sensitivity, maybe, but I would say political correctness necessarily has been a barrier, at least in the academic community, to address this problem. It's really been more an interpretation of what this ideology means.

**BROUN:**

Well, I disagree with you. I think the Fort Hood incident -- political correctness was the biggest barrier to -- to preventing that terrorist attack that occurred down there, the very tragic terrorist attack that -- one of the soldiers that was killed was from my district, and I think political correctness was very much in play there.

Changing tracks -- I just throw this out -- I've got just one minute left. I believe very firmly that -- that on-the-ground human intelligence within communities, whether it's within

the -- the radical Muslim community, whether it's within the radical ecoterrorist groups, whether it's with the radical animal protection groups or the -- the others that -- that have been mentioned -- I would like you all's comment about my belief that -- that on-the-ground human intelligence I think is going to be one of the best ways, if not the very best way, of preventing the radicalization in -- and to -- to stop the process before it gets to a point of actually causing a terrorist attack.

So I throw it out just for the few seconds I have left. Mr. Macleod-Ball?

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

Thank you. I -- I think I disagree and agree in part with you. I don't think we can make -- be making decisions based upon individual associations with groups, no matter how bad their reputation may be.

However, if law enforcement, acting properly, determines that there -- that there is -- that it has probable cause to believe that a -- a particular set of individuals are appropriate to investigate because they anticipate or have committed unlawful acts, then certainly, they ought to go and investigate.

**BROUN:**

But you want to wait till they actually commit the terrorist attack or some -- or break the law before we intervene, and we've got to intervene before that.

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

Not necessarily. When -- when you have probable cause to investigate, it doesn't necessarily mean that an unlawful act has already been committed. And you know, we're -- we're sort of talking hypotheticals here.

But the law enforcement community has -- has a fairly rigid set of -- set of procedures. It has a basis for determining when to open a file, when to open an investigation in a particular set of circumstances.

And -- and those -- those rules have -- have been in place and policies have been in place for -- for quite some time. And members of this committee, I'm sure, are -- are aware of those procedures better than I am, having -- having worked in the law enforcement community in the past.

**BROUN:**

Madam Chairman, my time's expired, but I would appreciate a written response from all of you all regarding that question. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

**HARMAN:**

That request is acceptable to all of you? Thank you very much. Now I yield five minutes to Mr. Green of Texas.

**GREEN:**

Thank you, Madam Chair. And I thank the witnesses for appearing today.

The -- there -- there are words from South Pacific that are important, I think. The song in South -- a song has the words "you've got to be taught" in it. You're not born an evil person, a terrorist. You have to be taught. So you do have some mentoring that -- that takes place along the way.

And in the process of being taught to hate, we have the opportunity to negate this process. But we cannot do it inconsistently. We really have to develop consistency in dealing with hate, hate speech, hate crimes.

We are right to talk about how persons of ill repute from other places can do dastardly deeds, but we must also, with an equal degree of fervor, condemn those who are born right here who have been terrorizing people for scores of years.

We have to use the same language when we talk about the KKK and -- and talk about the evil that they represent and be as -- as committed to eliminating the KKK and its evil as we are to eliminating others who would perpetrate evil. The consistency has to be there.

And having lived under circumstances where fear was something that I had to cope with, I know that we have not done enough to be consistent with our rhetoric. And we cannot allow a certain amount of tolerance of hate to exist for some and expect to overwhelm others with our desire to do good.

Dr. King reminded us it's not just the work of evil people or the actions of the evil people but the inaction of good people that really can make a difference in what we do.

And good people, people of good will, have to use free speech just as people of evil will -- will use free speech. Free speech has to have a price when it has hate in it.

The price doesn't have to be incarceration. The price has to be people of good will stepping forward and saying, "This is wrong. This is hate that you're preaching."

And we've got to get people to a point where they will do this, and -- and it has to permeate the entirety of the community to be efficacious. So my -- my -- my question to all of you is this.

How do we make sure or how do we perfect a process that is consistent in approach to evil doers and not allow homegrown evil to receive less attention than evil that may come from without that is equally as bad?

And the KKK, I say to you, is an evil organization with evil intent. Rarely will you hear it said as I have just said it. But we have no problems condemning other evil. Evil is evil. We cannot tolerate it under any circumstances.

And I will start with the lady, your -- your commentary on how we can consistently deal with this, please.

**CRAGIN:**

Sure. I think as I -- as I mentioned earlier, I can't even begin to say how impressed I have been with Muslim community leaders in the United States who have done this, who have stood up and said, "No, this is wrong."

And I would agree with you that...

**GREEN:**

If I may just intercede for a moment, I want people to stand up and talk about how evil the KKK is, too. You know, that's the example.

**CRAGIN:**

Right. I was going to say so that is a nice example for the rest of us for -- for doing the same thing.

The only -- one thing I would add to that is then protecting those who speak out from backlash, I think, is an important component of this as well, and so -- so that there is almost a band-wagoning effect, and so that more and more people feel free to speak out.

But absolutely, I would say they're an example to all of us.

**GREEN:**

Yes, sir?

**WEINE:**

I think one way to think about this is -- is you're talking about counter narratives, counter narratives to hate, counter narratives to extremism, and I think that a counter narrative from one corner of our society can be inspiring and helpful to counter a narrative -- to those who want to preach counter narratives from other segments of society.

And -- and they should be spoken, and they should be -- they should be listened to. And my concern, along with Dr. Cragin, is that we could be doing more, especially the people who are economically disempowered or on the margins of society, to preach those counter narratives against hatred and fear. Thank you.

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

I really appreciate your comments, Congressman. The -- you know, the KKK grew out of a -- a radical or reactionary Christian philosophy used as the -- as part of -- part of its -- part of its history.

And yet I would say there is more in common between the KKK and the -- the Islamist groups who have been -- who have attacked our country than the KKK has with mainstream Christian values.

And that's the point, I think, of -- of our comments, is that -- is that you -- you've got to look not at the ideology that serves as the foundation for the organization but, rather, in their propensity for action.

Whether you are looking at the KKK, or some radical Islamic group who has attacked us, or non-ideological attacks -- look at -- look at the anthrax attacks, or the Columbine shootings, or any of the sort of non-ideological...

**GREEN:**

Let me interrupt you and ask the chair -- Madam Chair, would you be so kind as to let Dr. Zogby have a comment on this, too?

**HARMAN:**

I will...

**GREEN:**

Thank you.

**HARMAN:**

... Mr. Green. We -- we were entertaining the notion of each member having one more question. Maybe you would like to continue your time and have that count for your additional question.

**GREEN:**

I'll allow this to be my -- my time. Dr. Zogby, please?

**ZOGBY:**

I remember during the Clinton years the dialogue -- the national dialogue on race was an important effort to engage us all as a country in an examination of who we are and how we relate to one another.

He also held, I think, a rather stunning White House event on hate crimes that I was a participant in and -- and found it truly moving. I think we need more and not less of that.

I also think if there were -- if I were to fault that effort in one way, it was that it was too dependent on the president to go from place to place, and we didn't begin a national program of encouraging people independently to begin this conversation in their communities, on their campuses, et cetera.

Right after 9/11, President Bush did a rather stunning thing when he focused the nation on the American Muslim community and said they should not be seen as the enemy. And we had an avalanche of -- of -- of people in Hollywood and in -- in various forms of media and politics -- this House and the Senate passed resolutions.

People began town meetings in their communities talking about it. My community -- I will tell you, the measure of our country is that my community, the Arab community and the Muslim community as well never felt as protected and respected even in that most vulnerable of times, even when we were witnessing hate crimes like we never had before, because of the support we were receiving from institutions around this country. It all started with the president doing it.

And I think that we have an opportunity to do that again on many levels today and not be afraid to encourage a re-examination and a re- commitment to what it means to be America, what it means to be a diverse country of many strands woven into a fabric that has made us great.

If we allow that map to define us and to take those -- and I maintain isolated events, because each of them -- many of them are different.

Some of them are criminal activity converted to Islam, some of them are -- are people who went postal, and some of them are people recruited to fight in foreign -- foreign engagement, not to attack our country, despite the fact that I think that that engagement is wrong and it still should -- should be dealt with.

All of those things are wrong, and we have to look at them, but they cannot define our response. That's when I said not a sledgehammer but a scalpel. And one of the things to do is to begin this national dialogue not just in this hearing but among all of our people so that we, in fact, recommit ourselves to the...

**GREEN:**

I'm going to have to thank you, Doctor. I'm woefully over. Thank you, Madam Chair. You've been more than generous.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you. And thank you, Dr. Zogby.

Members who are interested in doing this will be able to ask one more brief question, starting with Mr. McCaul.

**MCCAUL:**

Thank you, Madam Chair. And, Mr. Green, thank you for that questioning. I think you hit the issue -- it's hatred, is what we're talking about.

And -- and my grandfather was -- lost his job because of the KKK because he was a Catholic, and it was a white supremacy -- it was a religious extremist movement not unlike what we're seeing today in terms of a radical Islamic extremist movement.

Not to categorize all Christians as being that way, or all Muslims as being that way, but we're talking about a radical form of hatred, a perverted sense of these religions, these two religions, taken to a radical point where action, unfortunately, is taken by some in a terrorist event.

The KKK portrayed terrorism in the United States, in my view, you know? And I think radical Islam portrays terrorism. They certainly did on 9/11. And that is -- and maybe it's a matter of semantics here, but I do think the ideology and the belief system -- you can't take it, you know, out part and parcel from the act -- from the act itself.

I think it does begin with a belief system that takes an individual to a point where the hatred is such -- Dr. Zogby, you said it well. When he said, "Allah Akbar," what he -- what he meant was, "I hate you." That's what he meant, Mr. Hasan at Fort Hood. That's what drove him to kill that day.

And so I think the ideology is -- the belief system is -- is the beginning of the process and the radical belief system.

And I think the great challenge that we have in this country is how, within the Constitution, to monitor activities of radical ideology and radical beliefs and to be able to prevent and deter that radical belief from going the next step into an act of violence.

And so with that, I -- if anybody would like to comment on that.

**HARMAN:**

That was a brief question. Yes, Mr. Macleod-Ball? Briefly, please.

**MACLEOD-BALL:**

Briefly, certainly. I -- I believe I disagree with your statement that it starts with a radical belief. I think the radical belief could come in the middle. It could come in the end. And it's the propensity to violence that really -- that really is the factor here.

And when you -- when you exercise your -- your responsibility to examine these issues, if you exclude other ideologies -- if you exclude the KKK from your investigation, you run the risk of missing something that's -- that may be critical to understanding the entire problem.

**MCCAUL:**

I completely agree with that. I completely agree with that. Yeah.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you.

**MCCAUL:**

Thank you.

**HARMAN:**

Mr. Carney, a question, please?

**CARNEY:**

I -- in the two terms I've been here, I've noticed that we often react to fear rather than courage. And I am damn tired of that. And I got to tell you that I was -- I'm very impressed with the panel and in what I've heard today.

And, Mr. Zogby, I really want to associate myself with your comments on differentiation here and what we can do. And to that end, your -- your discussion of being a Yemeni American or an Irish American or whatever the case might be -- how much do these -- these folks see themselves as a soldier, versus citizen, in these wars that they're involved in?

**ZOGBY:**

They do not, and that -- that's the important thing, is that the majorities of those communities see that ethnicity as part of their heritage and part of their origins, and the land where daddy came from. And that is the nature of exile politics.

It's the nature of the -- the kids whose parents came after the Hungarian 1956 revolution was squashed and whose parents kept talking about, "We're going to go back," and the kids - one generation are saying, "No, this is home."

And that's the process we have to encourage, is that sense that it's your heritage, it's your history, you can be proud of it, but this has become your new history, and this is the America that we become.

I -- I therefore think that we don't want to discourage Yemeni Americans from feeling proud about their heritage in Yemen, but what we want to do is make sure that that American side is strengthened and -- and given a sense of -- of purpose so that they identify -- the way that they express their concern about what's happening in Somalia is -- is by voting for a congressman who's going to support their position on those issues, or by getting engaged in a political discussion about what can America do to change politics in -- in Afghanistan, rather than, "I am becoming a soldier because I don't really belong here."

It's that alienation we have to cure, and that is the key here.

**CARNEY:**

Dr. Weine?

**WEINE:**

I think we should remember that these kids -- a lot of these people who -- who radicalize and get recruited are kids. They're 17 years old, 18 years old, 19 years old, in high school. They are not rational agents, you know, making logical decisions with -- you know, backed by the full weight of, you know, a balanced view of the world.

And they can act impulsively and quickly in response to a charismatic person. That makes them very vulnerable, so...

**CARNEY:**

How desensitized are these kids, do you think?

**WEINE:**

Desensitized to...

**CARNEY:**

To -- to violence.

**WEINE:**

I don't think -- well, the ones that I know -- they're -- they're not violent by nature, most of them. In fact, one of them wanted to be a doctor. They see themselves as healers, but they are desensitized to violence in their communities subject to a lot of community violence.

One of the kids who went to -- to Somalia was really struck by -- and wrote on his Facebook page the drive-by killing of -- of one of the kids in -- in Somalia -- in Minneapolis and said that could happen to me. And I think that changed his -- his view of the world.

So the -- the point I want to make is -- is this -- you know, it's kind of a "it takes a village" kind of idea, so teachers, parents, community leaders, not just one person in one conversation, but all these people have to be involved in the counter pull against that one recruiter, because ultimately we've got to -- we've got to convince a 17-year-old acting alone and impulsively to stay on our side and not to go to the other side.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you.

**CARNEY:**

Thank you, Madam Chair.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you. Dr. Broun?

**BROUN:**

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Quick question, I believe the only way we're going to stop terrorism in this country or worldwide is for the peace in the Muslim community. It's what we're most focused upon now.

And I think it's for peace-loving Muslims all over the world, in this country as well as elsewhere, to say, "That's enough. We've had enough of this. We're going to put a stop to it."

And it's true within all communities, whether it's in our communities with the KKK or any other communities. I think the way to stop this is for people to be -- within that community to say, "No." And we're going to prevent it ourselves within our own community.

Do you agree with that, each of you? And if so, how can we promote that more so as a committee and as a -- as a government, from the U.S. governmental perspective?

Jump in.

**WEINE:**

Yes, I -- I completely agree with that. And -- and it concerns me -- again, to take the Somali example as -- as one indicator of this -- that a year down the line those parents of those kids who -- who went away -- nobody has reached out to them.

They're sitting there with their story. They haven't told their story. They have a story to tell to other community members. Nobody's helped them to do that, not psycho-social workers, not community police, not -- not -- not -- and they feel victimized not only by what happened to their kids but by this lack of response and then by all the media attention.

You, I think, have to find ways to support parents and community leaders like that not just to stand up for community values or participate in the community dialogue but to specifically counter radicalization and recruitment.

And I think the -- the effort of -- of a bill that was once proposed in general is what's needed, a government entity to address that. So that's what I think you could do.

**BROUN:**

Well, Doctor, specifically how would you do that, though? How would you reach out to these Somali families? How would you reach out to -- to any others not only in this country but worldwide?

**WEINE:**

Well, we are, and I would do it in the spirit of collaboration. Say, you know, "The best protection of your community is going to be people in your community stepping up, but yet we know certain things about, say, how to prevent teenagers from doing other bad kinds of things like drugs, gang involvement or sexually risky behavior, so let's -- let's merge the expertise from -- from science and -- and community values and let's get that work done in community, on-the-ground kind of activities."

BROUN:

Thank you, Doctor. That was quick -- quicker than anybody else, Madam Chair.

**HARMAN:**

Thank you, Dr. Broun.

Let me conclude with no questions but just an observation. First, we have a problem, and this subcommittee is dedicated and has been dedicated over many years on a bipartisan basis to find a solution, to find the right intervention strategies so that this problem of people becoming terrorists, whatever their motivations are, is hopefully reduced and we prevent the death of hundreds, thousands, of innocent Americans, probably on American soil, if possible. We have a problem.

Second point I want to make is that security and liberty are not a zero-sum game. I've said this over and over and over again. You can either get more of both or less.

And I predict that if we don't work together on the right intervention strategies and there is another major attack or series of major attacks on U.S. soil, the first casualty is going to be our Constitution.

I don't want that to happen, and I appreciate the fact that all these panelists and many others we consult don't want that to happen either, and therefore we need to focus on what are the right set of intervention strategies.

Third point is we are not limiting our inquiry to the Arab American community or the Muslim American community. We never were limiting it. And the comments of numbers of members about a broader inquiry I thought were very valuable. And the comments of the witnesses about this were very valuable. So I think we've built a very good record here.

Finally, to Dr. Weine, obviously my favorite witness since he liked our bill, that bill was well intended. I don't think any of you disputes that. The goal of setting up a multidisciplinary commission was to give us better advice.

It wasn't to tell us what to do. It wasn't to develop a legislative strategy. But it was to give us better advice so we would act based on information and not just based on emotion, or passion, or personal prejudice that any of us might have.

So I continue to feel that -- not necessarily that that bill has to become law -- I know there are strong objections -- but that working together on a better strategy is imperative, and I want to leave that message with all of you. And I see people nodding, so you're in. You're in the tent.

And -- and a strategy perhaps based on a refinement of that old bill, perhaps based on a way to go after recruiters specifically, perhaps based on a -- a better understanding of good

community policing and good community strategies, and certainly including the words "thank you" to those who are trying to help is -- is a way forward.

So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for very valuable questions. If members in addition to Dr. Broun have other questions in writing, I hope witnesses will comply.

Having no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[End]